Egypt’s hesitant path to democracy

Amr Hamzawy

Anne-Marie Impe

We are witnessing unusual scenes in the Arab world. Mass demonstrations in Lebanon, joint protest rallies of Egyptian Islamists and liberals against the Mubarak regime, and municipal elections in Saudi Arabia are just as much features of the current situation as ceasefire declarations by Palestinian resistance movements, and multi-party negotiations for the formation of a coalition government in Iraq. The Arab world is changing, and in a very profound fashion. Confronted with increasingly disenchanted domestic populations as well as Western, primarily American, efforts to promote democracy in the region and press for it a representative number of Arab governments have embarked on the road of political reforms or accelerated the pace of their realization. Changing regional conditions, especially since the collapse of the Baath regime in Iraq, have helped creating an unprecedented momentum for debating the perspectives of democratic transformation from Morocco to Bahrain. Never before 2003 was the public interest in power sharing and good governance as genuine and far-reaching as it has been since then.

Yet, the path to Arab democracy continues to be problematic. Approaching the contemporary regional political reveals that the predominantly missing element when compared to more successful experiences of political transformation elsewhere is the emergence of democratic opposition movements with considerable constituencies that contest authoritarian power and force concessions. International efforts to promote democracy in societies where the tradeoffs of undemocratic governance continue to be bearable for the ruling elites do not suffice to make political reforms plausible or viable. Without the formation of far-reaching popular alliances for democracy the Arab autocrats and their meanwhile rather sophisticated state apparatuses will eventually manage to deal with external pressures either by inventing a “theatre of democratization” based on cosmetic reforms or by discrediting them publicly as acts of foreign aggression against the national sovereignty. History informs us that authoritarian rulers are best equipped to successfully play the game of “us against them” and in doing so to portray themselves as national heroes whose unquestioned obedience becomes a sacred duty.

Recent events in Egypt confirm these doubts. They shed light on two major dilemmas of the current political situation on the Nile: the undemocratic nature of the ruling regime and the structural weakness of opposition parties and movements. In the last two years the Egyptian government seemed determined for a time to initiate a series of internal reforms. There was a significant injection of young technocrats into the new cabinet formed in July 2004, which was accompanied by efforts to modernize state structures. However, the policies and programs of the reformist group—mostly mid-career professionals, businessmen, and university staff members centered around the president’s son Gamal Mubarak —have proved both fragile and blatantly contradictory to the democratization demands emanating from a wide spectrum of liberal, leftist, and moderate Islamist opposition forces.

The reformers within the NDP do not have a clear vision of the political transformation needed, and they remain part of the ruling establishment that is unwilling to relinquish any of its control over society. Preserving power and securing public order, both structural attributes of semiauthoritarianism, continue to be the fundamental priorities of the Egyptian regime. Throughout the last two years, the inability of opposition forces and civil society actors to mobilize broader constituencies behind these reform imperatives, and subsequently the absence of pressure on the government, has resulted in an overall stagnation of Egyptian politics.

Almost three decades ago, after President Anwar Al Sadat initiated the Open Door Policy in 1976, Egypt appeared to embark on the road to democracy and a market economy. However, since then the ruling regime, including both its military and technocratic components, has favored a more gradual transformation to a limited political pluralism and neoliberal privatization. It succeeded in violently marginalizing opposing political alternatives, which regardless of their specific ideological nature might have been viable within society at different moments of contemporary Egyptian history. Leaving the government’s rhetoric aside, the “democratization in spurts” model of the ruling regime has led to no more than minor reforms on the fringes of the political sphere. The system of power relationships and constitutional and legal arrangements organizing political participation remains essentially unchanged and decidedly semiauthoritarian in nature.

The Egyptian constitution, issued in 1971, vests enormous authority in the president as the head of the state and empowers the executive branch over both the legislative branch and the judiciary. Although President Mubarak’s recent decision to amend article 76 of the constitution allowing for more than one candidate to run in the upcoming presidential election next fall represents a significant reform step, there is a real danger that it will be robbed of all meaning in case of a practice based on the model used in Tunisia, where President Bin Ali carefully stages the inevitable extension of his period in office along pluralist lines.

Since 1980, Egypt has had a bicameral parliament, elected in popular elections, but much of the apparent pluralism is cosmetic. In both the People’s Assembly and the Consultative Council, the ruling NDP currently has almost 90 percent of the seats. Elections are regularly manipulated in favor of the NDP, and its dominance is further strengthened by the fact that Mubarak is the head of both the state and the party. The result of this system is an authoritarianism favoring the intermingling of state and party structures. Opposition political parties, if not co-opted and fully controlled by the authorities, are highly restricted in their activities. The Emergency Law (the state of emergency was extended three more years by the People’s Assembly on February 23, 2003) prohibits parties from organizing public meetings without prior permission from the ministry of interior and subjects them to direct supervision by state security forces. Any attempt to criticize the regime for its lack of commitment to reform or to publicly articulate alternative political views is discredited with two types of characterizations: either the criticisms or views represent the demands of a handful of isolated intellectuals who have no understanding of what the masses really want or they represent a dangerous attempt on the part of Islamist “elements” to take over society and control the state.

Moreover, the Political Parties Law of 1977 prohibits the legalization of parties based on religious or ethnic identities. Therefore, moderate Islamist movements, which probably have the largest constituency among the Egyptian public, are not permitted to form political parties. The legal framework for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Egypt is governed by Law No. 84 of 2002, which limits the organizational and financial autonomy of civic associations through a series of registration and reporting requirements, further restricting their sphere of influence. In all these areas, no traces of substantial transformation can be discerned in the last two years of the government’s reform policies. Instead, the regime has recently been stepping up its repression of opposition leaders and movements rallying for constitutional reform and against Mubarak’s fifth term.

The major legitimizing strategy for the Egyptian model of “democratization” has been twofold: one, systematically evoke the well-worn mantra that economic reforms must come before political reform, and two, consistently maintain that the population needs to be prepared for democracy before reforms can take place. It is difficult to find substantial differences between the apologetic appraisals for restricted pluralism that dominated the political sphere during the 1970s and 1980s and the approach of the allegedly reform-oriented cabinet of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif (since July 2004) with its one-sided emphasis on economic modernization. The notion that “Egyptians need bread, not freedom of association” seems to be the official credo of the regime in portraying itself as the legitimate representative of the real needs of the Egyptian society.

The government’s economic policies, however, which are dominated by a neoliberal approach, have marginalized large segments of the population. Privatization is posited as the ultimate key to economic growth, whereas gross disparities in the distribution of wealth, unemployment, and poverty and the increasing marginalization of the middle classes are absent from any discussion. According to the UN Development Program’s Human Poverty Index, 30.9 percent of the population lives below the poverty level. Under such conditions, ignoring the social dimensions of the market economy ultimately results in the lack of popular support for implemented reforms. The transformation to a socially responsible market economy is just as problematic and ambivalent as the democratization process has been. Since 1976 the state has been retreating from the economic sphere and attempting to consolidate privatization and liberalization. However, throughout the last three decades, and with the exception of the first half of the 1990s, the performance of the major sectors of the Egyptian economy has been deteriorating. Lack of vision, insufficient market regulations, and divergent perceptions and interests within the ruling elite have created the conditions for the emergence of an “anything goes” capitalist transformation.

In defending its approach, the ruling regime depends on the notion of Egyptian exceptionalism. The “Egyptian way to democratic transformation” formula is systematically put forward by leading regime figures to justify cosmetic and minor steps as the gradualism needed to introduce democratization measures to an Arab-Muslim society whose majority is not demanding democracy. However, a go-slow approach without a clear timetable and a clear understanding of the changes that are needed, such as amending the constitution and opening up the political sphere for new parties by abolishing existing restrictive mechanisms, remains a corrupt, apologetic defense of authoritarianism. The events of the last two years clearly demonstrate that these “democracy-containment” strategies have been extremely effective for the Egyptian government. For example, Western pressure on Mubarak to democratize has remained firmly in the realm of rhetoric and has not moved toward political conditionality, and democratic opposition movements with large constituencies are still absent in Egypt.

In addition to restrictions imposed by the government, both opposition movements and civil society actors face various internal dilemmas. Although the party system is fundamentally established and shows a moderate degree of fragmentation, the NDP dominates it with its strong hold over the legislative and the executive branches. The four major opposition parties—the liberal Al Wafd Party, the leftist National Progressive Unionist Party, the Arab Nasserist Party, and the Al Ghad Party—are structurally weak and lack constituencies large enough to mobilize popular support. Ten other small parties are active, but their numbers and political relevance are inconsequential.

In contrast, there are approximately 16,000 registered civic associations. Even by regional standards, however, the diversified topography of vital social interests is still underrepresented; the poor, the weak, the marginalized, and the rural constituencies are excluded from the system. In the 1950s and 1960s the state functioned as the major representative of these groups, but since the Open Door Policy began in 1976, the state has been retreating from various social spheres with no viable substitutes taking its place. Representation of interests has become a monopoly of powerful political and economic elites—a dangerous situation considering that the exclusion of large segments of the Egyptian population has always resulted in social unrest, radical currents, and political apathy.

Moreover, democratic norms and procedures are contested in the Egyptian public sphere and do not enjoy a relatively high degree of acceptance. Concepts such as democracy, good governance, and pluralism evoke, at least partially, distrust among the majority of Egyptian citizens because of the government’s systematic misuse of these principle. Two other factors contribute to this alarming reality. First, religious-based perceptions of society and polity, which ultimately stand for an alternative normative order, appeal to a large portion of the population. Second, the prevailing political culture since the 1950s is one of submission and fear of the ruler. A series of polls conducted in summer 2004 by Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies show that almost 60 percent of Egyptians viewed democratic norms and procedures as less important than combating poverty, campaigning against corruption, and improving the public education system. For example, the newly founded Egyptian Movement for Change Kifaya (Enough) attracts no more than 1000 people for its continuous rallies organized to demand constitutional and political reforms.

Egypt’s political conditions have not evolved significantly in the direction of democracy, and they instead present a model of semiauthoritarian stagnation. To its credit, Egypt has maintained stability in an explosive region, but it still faces a set of major political and socioeconomic challenges. Government reform policies stop short of introducing substantial changes into the political power structure and the restrictive patterns of political participation prevailing in the country. Apparently, the only way to end the current stalemate is to mobilize large constituencies for political reform. Opposition parties and civil society actors, however, are either co-opted or marginalized. Moderate Islamists have the potential to reach out to considerable constituencies, but they are suppressed by the government’s security forces and have rather limited room for maneuver. If the United States and Europe are serious about promoting democracy in Egypt, they should promote the integration of Islamists in the political process. Without the active participation of Islamists calls for political reform on the Nile are bound to remain the whisper of closed communities irrelevant for the social fabric in large and harmless for authoritarian regimes.

Amr Hamzawy is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington. He previously taught Arab politics at Cairo University and the Free University of Berlin. His research interests include the changing dynamics of political participation and the prospects of democratic transformation in the Arab world, with special attention both to Egypt and the Gulf countries.