A two-track Arab World
[Back to table of content]

ncrease Font Size   Decrease Font Size
Print article

Bassma Kodmani
The political scientist Bassma Kodmani is the director of the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) and a researcher with the Collège de France. She has run the Middle East Department of the French Institute for Foreign Relations (IFRI) and the Governance, Civil Society, and International Co-operation Programme of the Ford Foundation’s Office for the Middle East and North Africa.


The Arab World is cracking under the onslaught of globalisation. Some States are surfing the wave of modernity, while others have been struck head-on by competition from the emerging countries – all this in the context of Islamism’s rising power. According to Bassma Kodmani, the status quo is not an option. Interview

Enjeux internationaux: The Arab World is often described as a region outpaced by globalisation and hobbled by major economic and political handicaps. What is its place on the global map that the powering up of the emerging countries is redrawing?

Bassma Kodmani: But the emerging countries include some Arab countries! You effectively have to differentiate between the oil-exporting countries and non-oil-exporting countries, and, in the last group, between the industrialised countries and the rest. The Gulf countries are objectively incorporated in the globalisation process. They influence international financial flows, especially since the absolutely phenomenal new boom in oil prices. Their considerable resources enable them to sit at the major powers’ tables, to apply for membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and to participate in major international financial negotiations.
Their leaders see themselves as members of a new elite trained according to the British and US models, which is the case for 90% of them. They are drawn to modernity and inspired by the model of Anglo-American society. They feel that they have the financial and intellectual means to engage in projects with the West, as the partnerships with American universities that are setting up campuses in the region show. To strengthen this perception, these countries have also thrown themselves into US-style patronage. This is no longer charity according to Muslim tradition, but institutionalised philanthropy that finances projects in the areas of culture and university education (museums, research, and so on).

Yet the Gulf countries appear fragile. The presence of large religious minorities in a context of Sunni-Shi'a confrontation and the massive reliance on immigrant labour can present real risks for the model that you have described.
Some of these countries have very small populations. There is no socio-economic problem, for there is work for everyone. Disparities exist, but they have not yet led to the production model’s being challenged. If this model collapsed, there obviously would be problems. However, to guard against this scenario, the emirates have begun a massive diversification effort, leaping directly from pumping oil to the service economy (hotels, banks, and finance), to leading-edge technology, the media, and conference centres. Services are already more important than oil in countries such as Bahrain and the emirate of Dubai.
The region sees itself as the heart of a knowledge network. In that it seems today to be answering the shock triggered by the publication of the UNDP report ? on the “knowledge society” as a spearhead of modernisation and are trying to take remedial action.
That said, these countries must re-examine their policies towards immigrant workers. It is unimaginable for these people still to be deprived of rights after so many years of residence. How can they be integrated gently without challenging the nature of political power in the country? The stakes are high.

And the religious issue?
It is submerged by wealth. Quick modernisation, based on the knowledge economy, is seen as a way to combat the conservatives. We are thus witnessing a genuine race against time to vanquish the region’s reactionary forces.

Has Saudi Arabia also embarked on this path?
Saudi Arabia is more cautious, for its religious institutions are very powerful and it has concerns about its autonomous national security that the smaller Gulf States, which rely entirely on the United States for their security, do not have. Still, a younger generation that has a true vision of tomorrow’s strategic interests is gaining influence within the royal family. The king himself knows that oil prices can fall. He is also envisioning the end of the oil age and the need to switch to another form of service economy. His determination to modernise even entails a certain promotion of women’s rights in areas where spaces are opening up: in education and employment. There are more and more women heads of companies and trade union leaders. The country’s conservative forces hesitate to challenge the king.
The regime wants to diversify its trade, diplomatic, and strategic relations. Arabia is turning to China and negotiating trade contracts in India. America has become too burdensome, because it sparks phenomena such as Bin Laden. By negotiating a reduction in the US troops stationed in Saudi Arabia and their retreat into enclaves, Arabia seems to have recovered its freedom, even though it continues to moderate the oil market to protect the importing countries’ interests.

Is China an ally or rival in this context?
For some countries, China is a considerable danger. The invasion of Chinese goods in Egypt and, to a certain extent, Jordan, is causing factory closings and rising unemployment and poverty. The situation, in the long run, is explosive. These countries have trade commitments with the European Union and are going to go through a very deep crisis in this free-trade world.
Indeed, a country such as Egypt lives on two different tracks. An elite of some 100 people having ties with the United States and working in Egyptian multinationals projects itself in a world of emerging powers where it believes it has a place. This is totally unrealistic. The political leadership is totally “divorced” from public opinion. The regime, which is often criticised for “racism against the poor”, has opted for liberalisation and privatisation, whereas the people continue to expect a Welfare State.
This example applies to other Arab countries, to Morocco, for example, where a modernising, French-speaking elite that is non-religious and just as ashamed of the “ignorant masses” as the Egyptian elite dominates.

Some people talk about a Chinese model for the Arab World…
Indeed, this model attracts the Arab countries, because it allows economic growth without reforming the political power structure and gives the lie to the Western model which banks on the link between economic and political openness.

Won’t Iraq weigh heavily on the region’s security and its chances of an economic boom?
The risk of this is real and the neighbouring countries are wondering how to protect themselves from an uncontrollable crisis. Saudi Arabia is building a wall at its borders, but the small Gulf countries have not chosen a credible defence system. These states are thus relying on the United States for their foreign defence and often on private companies for their domestic protection. This system will last as long as Washington has vital oil or financial interests in the region.

Is not the possibility of more political openness in the Arab World compromised by the Islamist peril?

It’s a problem of squaring the circle: If you open the political system, you open the door to the Islamists. If you keep authoritarianism, you strengthen the Islamists. Actually, the current political system is producing Islamism. In an authoritarian context devoid of true pluralism, the Islamists are the only ones talking about social ills. That does not mean that they are proposing consistent or convincing economic models. In any event, they are not challenging the market economy model.
Islamism is a social movement that has turned itself into a political party. The other opposition parties are interested only in political reforms, electoral laws, and constitutional changes, with a view to either sharing power or exploding the padlocks. However – and that is their great weakness – they have almost no social planks in their platforms.

Conclusion: Don’t touch the status quo and maintain the authoritarian systems, because the alternative would be worse?
That’s the wrong conclusion. On the contrary, the Arab World must on the contrary open up and accept to deal with the Islamists, setting conditions that the latter subscribe to some fundamental democratic principles, to wit: respect for the nature of the State; religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity; and respect for minorities. More and more moderate Islamist movements are making such commitments.

Interview by Jean-Paul Marthoz

When the UNDP triggers controversy
The UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) published a four-volume series of reports on human development and governance in the Arab World starting in 2002. These reports, which were highly critical of various reigning powers, triggered great controversy. The 2003 report bore the title Building a Knowledge Society and the 2005 edition tackled the issue of women’s advancement.

For more information
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI): A network of ten Arab research and policy institutes set up for the purpose, of promoting “a program of democratic reform in the Arab World that is realistic and home grown” in partnership with four European and one US institute. Its members include the El-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (Cairo), Centre d’études et de recherches en sciences sociales (Morocco), Palestinian Center for Policy Survey and Research (Ramallah), Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (Beyrouth), FRIDE (Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, Madrid), Center for European Reform (London), and ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Athens).
www.arab-reform.net