Since 1996, Nepal has been in the grips of an intense civil war between rebels of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) and government security forces. When the conflict first began, the Maoists were disregarded as an anachronism, and not much stock was given to the fact that in the poorest and least developed parts of the country, the Maoists held sway without use of force. Their call for nationalization of state assets, end of a still feudal monarchy, redistribution of wealth and land was viewed by the poor as the only recourse to their strangling poverty. By the time Kathmandu finally woke up and deployed the army in 2001, much of the Nepali countryside was firmly in Maoist control.

Administration after administration floundered in the face of the insurgency, which has seen tremendous abuses of human rights by both sides. Nepal's newly established democracy began to show signs of strain as each elected government remained unable to resolve the conflict. After rumors of a palace coup surfaced in late 2004, diplomat after diplomat warned the King that such a move would only play into the hands of the Maoists, who argued that the monarch was only interested in power and not the people. The King ignored this advice. On February 1, he announced that he was taking all executive authority into his hands. His gambit was simple: Nepalis and the world would have to choose between him and the Maoists, confident that they would see him as at least the lesser evil.

Since then, the primary question for outside states, and particularly for India, the U.S. and the U.K, has been whether or not to suspend military aid. The Royal Nepali Army (RNA) has long been under the tutelage of the Indian army, and India has been its primary arms supplier. Since 2001, the United States has provided $29 million in military financing, including as many as 20,000 M-16 assault rifles. The United Kingdom has provided what it describes as "nonlethal" equipment, including helicopters and trucks.

Those in favor of continuing military aid argue that the Maoists are the greater evil and that soldiers fighting them, as one retired U.S. military observer put it, "should not have to fight with 50-year old Lee Enfield rifles that jam and have to be constantly reloaded." An active duty U.S. officer made the case for continuing deliveries, saying, "The guns the RNA has don't shoot straight, the bullets tumble, the weapons jam. The army needs a standard army rifle, like the M-16, which is much more reliable."

Opponents of military aid argue that a cut would signal opposition to Gyanendra's coup and continuing human rights abuses by the RNA. Suspension would make it difficult to prosecute an aggressive war, and could ultimately force Gyanendra to return the country to civilian rule. Many observers also worry that the provision of more and better guns will lead to an escalation of the conflict, particularly when those guns are put into the hands of poorly trained soldiers. The latter point is conceded by the retired U.S. officer: "The RNA has the worst command and control anywhere I've ever been. The army doesn't understand what the problem is with killing Maoists, even if they are not combatants."

King Gyanendra long assumed that his "us or them" message would appeal to India, Nepal's neighbor and most important foreign partner. Gyanendra was also banking on the many cultural, historical and religious links between the two countries. The countries are so close that many assume that if the Nepali government were to collapse, India would intervene before the Maoists could take power.

But India surprised the king by responding to the February 2005 palace coup by demanding a restoration of democracy and suspending military aid. This move could prove a watershed in Indian foreign policy. India has never made democracy a significant part of its diplomacy, regularly using the slogan of "noninterference in internal affairs" as a shield against criticism of its own rights record. At the time of this writing, India had resumed some non-lethal military aid to Nepal, but was still demanding a return to democracy before resuming full military assistance.

Gyanendra also hopes that by invoking the Maoists he can push Washington's anti-communist button. This attempt initially led the U.S. embassy in Kathmandu to urge Washington to give the king a chance. But moderates in the State Department and in Congress have taken an increasingly strong position in favour of a return to democratic governance. In September, the United States announced that it was unable to certify that the RNA had complied with conditions required by U.S. legislation in order to receive arms. For the time being, the United States has suspended lethal assistance to the RNA.

The possibility that the Nepali state might collapse is becoming ever more real. Neutral military observers do not believe that either side can win a military victory. The RNA is pinned down in its bases, hardly able to project itself into the countryside. The Maoists control much of the countryside, but they are too weak to take Kathmandu by force. Because of the primitive nature of the combat, the victory's cost in human lives, according to a British analyst, "would be too high for either side to sustain."

So what is the way out? One option is internationally supervised peace talks, perhaps through the UN. But India's strategic and visceral distaste for international mediation of conflicts is an obstacle. It vociferously opposes UN or other outside mediation over Kashmir. India has already rebuffed quiet UN suggestions that, as a neutral party, the UN may have a role in bringing an end to the conflict.

The second stumbling block to negotiations is more obvious: they may not work. It is unclear if either Gyanendra or the Maoists are prepared to negotiate in good faith, or if any settlement is possible. The last round of peace talks in 2003 ended bitterly when RNA forces summarily executed 19 captured Maoists. Since then, the mistrust has increased on both sides.

The best remaining option may be to use human rights protections as the organizing principle for political progress. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was invited in to establish a monitoring operation, largely to head off official criticism at the 2005 meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights. Both the Nepali government and the Maoists have made public commitments to work with the human rights office. In the absence of peace talks, the UN human rights office may end up being the only confidence-building and conflict-resolution game in town.

A top priority is real reform of the RNA. For this to occur, there will have to be effective monitoring and training by their peers in foreign militaries. Military trainers from India, the United Kingdom, and the United States need to make it clear that failing to distinguish between civilians and combatants, executing or torturing prisoners, "disappearing" people, and failing to prosecute those violate these norms will jeopardize or end military-to-military relationships.

Washington, in particular, has an important role to play. The "Leahy Law" requires that the United States suspend assistance to any military unit known to have committed serious human rights violations. Soldiers receiving U.S. training have to be vetted. Unfortunately, the Pentagon puts hardly any resources into monitoring or vetting of the RNA, relying largely on anecdotal information picked up in conversations with RNA officers or from other embassies in Kathmandu.

The U.S. military argues that engagement with a foreign military automatically improves that military's human rights record. But this is an unproven assertion, and there is no attempt to follow the career paths of officers trained by the United States to determine whether such training has any effect on their human rights records. A further weakness lies in the training itself, which is not designed specifically for dealing with populations in counter-insurgent environments.

The world and most Nepalis know that brutal Maoists and a vicious army are not the only options. If King Gyanendra wants to end the war, and ensure the continuance of the monarchy, he must win back public confidence. This will require restoration of a civilian government, working with the political parties, the scheduling of elections, and evidence that the RNA is changing the way it operates. For their part, the Maoists need to end their rough summary justice, agree to good-faith negotiations, and show the world that an agreement with them would be worth the paper it is written on. Otherwise, the misery in Nepal will continue.