Latin America has reappeared on Washington's radar screen. Part of the region, the Andean arc¹ , which is affected by phenomena such as drug trafficking and government destabilisation, especially worries the United States. This fear has heightened, for Washington fears that the conjunction of all of these individual uncontrolled crises, occurring in an already agitated subregional context, will create a domino effect, as occurred during the Cold War, that will exacerbate the already noticeable tensions in the Southern Cone and Central America.

Three lost decades
The historical background can shed some light on the current regional crisis. Latin America effectively continues to suffer at the dawn of the 21^st century from its legacy of unresolved problems.

The 1970s were a "lost decade" in political terms: the proliferation of authoritarian governments² - with the exception of a few islands of limited democracy - culminated in abuses of power, law-breaking, human rights violations, and the devaluing of public ethics. It greatly weakened the countries' institutions.

The 1980s, for their part, were a "lost decade" in economic terms. They were effectively marked by anaemic growth, excessive indebtedness, great volatility, growth of the informal economy, insufficient technological development, and a collapse in the quality of life.

Finally, the 1990s were lost on the social front. They were characterised by increasing inequalities, polarisation between classes and ethnic groups, the persistence of high rates of poverty and destitution, increased urban violence, skyrocketing unemployment, under-investment in education, and deteriorating health conditions.

We would be deluding ourselves to believe that the impact of so many years of malaise could continue indefinitely or the use of force would provide the solution.

At the gates of ungovernability
If we take as our reference an ideal model designed on the basis of a continuum between "good" and "bad" government, the Andean region is on the road to becoming ungovernable. According Philippe Schmitter's proposed definition³, four indicators may be used to identify this syndrome. The first sign is unruliness: The people rely increasingly on force, violent methods, and illicit or irregular methods, regardless of their social, political, and ethnic origins, to influence public policies. Next comes instability: The ruling elites are no longer able to discharge their political leadership or maintain effective coalitions. This stage is followed by ineffectualness: The administration is no longer able to define or enforce its objectives. Finally, illegality sets in: The most powerful players try to avoid all controls and legal limitations in order to enhance their personal and extralegal advantages.

The events of the last decade in the Andes are complex and diverse. They show to what extent this area is on the brink of ungovernability, a phenomenon that is part of a larger framework of a far-reaching and increasingly widespread crisis in Latin America.

Cold War reflexes
In response to this critical situation, Washington has reacted in the purest Cold War tradition. Indeed, US decision-makers' visions, budgets, and policies regarding Latin America in general and the Andean arc in particular have changed little over the past three decades. A bundle of factors supports this view.

1. As during the Cold War, ideology weighs heavily on everything. Whereas communism was the inexorable enemy in the past, it has been replaced by radical populism. So, on 24 March 2004 General James Hill, who was Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Command⁴ at the time, told Congress that the traditional threats emanating from Latin America "…are now complemented by an emerging threat best described as radical populism". As an example he gave Hugo Chavez's Venezuela.

Until recently, this thesis, which has been endorsed by the new head of the Southern Command, General Brantz Craddock, did not seem to wash with the civilians. However, after Condoleezza Rice replaced Colin Power as the head of the State Department, this definition of radical populism as a threat for the United States acquired a decisive place in their foreign and defence policies.

In this respect, three important points should be stressed: the military devised this category of radical populism and custom tailored it for Latin America (no one in Washington uses this term to qualify dangers emanating from Africa or Asia); during the Cold War, the US looked kindly on the rise of populism (and that of Islamism, one should add), for it was an antidote to Communism; and in many countries populism was a component of political life that made it possible to include sectors that were traditionally excluded.

2. This return to the Cold War can be seen in the persistence of low-intensity conflict thinking. In the 1970s and 1980s Central America was a theatre of such conflicts. Today, it's the case of Colombia: The US intervenes indirectly in this country through massive military assistance, strong-arm diplomacy, and the active presence - but without direct participation in combat - of members of its armed forces. Bogota boasts the second largest US embassy in the world, just behind Iraq. The country hosts 800 North American military personnel and 600 North American private specialists and is the main Latin American beneficiary of aid from Washington, as well as the fifth leading recipient of military assistance in the world (after Israel, Egypt, Afghanistan, and Iraq). Bogota received close to 3,647 million US dollars between 1998 and 2004. For 2005, this sum should reach US$781 million.

3. Another similarity with the Cold War lies in the US's will to promote a "regime change" policy. This notion may seem new to those who have forgotten or are unfamiliar with the history of post-World War II inter-American relations. During a large part of the Cold War the US tolerated or encouraged the toppling of reform-minded democratic regimes⁵ and their replacement with authoritarian governments. The return to these old practices in the post-9/11 context can be seen in the coup d'Etat against Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez in 2002. If the incitation for "regime change" contributes to the collapse of our fragile democracies, this will be disastrous for Latin America, especially for the Andean region.

4. The "war on drugs" is another constant. This war on drug was launched by Richard Nixon in 1971 and was stepped up in the region in the early 1980s. The US is stubbornly continuing to conduct a ruinous operation that has neither dismantled the narcotics trade nor improved the state's ability to exercise sovereign control. What is more, those who have accumulated the most power are the mafias that are getting rich by trafficking cocaine and the peasants who plant coca. Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia are emblematic examples of this war's failure. In the case of Colombia, even though the state sprayed chemicals on close to 523,000 hectares of coca plantations between 2000 and 2004, close to 100,000 hectares of plantations still existed at the start of 2005. Even though Colombia's President Álvaro Uribe authorised more than 310 extraditions over his past three years as the head of the country's government (the overwhelming majority were Colombians, with the US being the main destination), the drug control policy has been a failure. Indeed, one can procure more drugs, at better prices, and of better quality, in US streets today than in the 1990s.

5. The "double standard" policy has also made a comeback in the area of fighting terrorism. During the Cold War, the simultaneous support given by the US and USSR to certain groups that relied on terror was reflected by the following formula: "my" freedom fighter is "your" terrorist, and vice versa. The Colombian case could become the litmus test for making similar distinctions between "good" and "bad" terrorists. Indeed, although the paramilitary groups of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia are on the list of national terrorist groups drawn up by the State Department, the US Attorney General recently issued a secret opinion that should allow Washington to support and finance a possible demobilisation of this armed far-right group. Yet evidence has been brought forward in Colombia and abroad to the effect that this group is directly tied to the illegal drug trade and has committed countless massacres.

6. Despite the continental interdependence rhetoric, the US's proverbial disinterest in social issues cannot be denied. Washington's current attitudes toward Bolivia and Ecuador prove that very little has changed since the Cold War. Neither Bolivia nor Ecuador meets the definition of a failed state as it is generally used. Indeed, a failed state is characterised by widespread institutional illegitimacy and its inability to protect its citizens and ensure safe living conditions. Still, the acute weakening of the state that is occurring in these two countries could lead to a situation of anarchy, even the absence of central government. "Defective" globalisation is eroding the state's sovereignty even more, weakening the national productive base, reinforcing social fragmentation, and limiting diplomatic authority in both countries. The majority of the factors that currently determine the realities in Ecuador and Bolivia - the degree of stability, reassertion of identities, exploitation of energy resources, proliferation of the illegal drug trade, border issues, secessionist temptations, and geopolitical fragility - are shot through with powerful external forces. Given this situation, Washington has clearly shown itself to be socially and materially insensitive to these two nations. That leads one to believe that the US might once again let itself be tempted, as in the past, to use some "muscle" to try to solve crises of magnitude.

A role for the Southern Cone
The United States' renewed concern about the Andean world is founded on the same principles, objectives, and mechanism as before. In the past this attitude did not lead to a better order, but today it could spark even more disorder. South America cannot allow itself to go through another Cold War with new "axes of evil", "regime changes", or "pre-emptive attacks". That is why the (relatively unstable) Southern Cone countries must devise a realistic strategy directed at the Andean region that includes a weighted mixture of principles and pragmatism. It is a time for political moderation, material engagement, and preventive diplomacy. This is in the region's interest, but also ultimately in the United States' interest. Failing that, the threat of territorial, ethnic, and political "balkanisation" will loom on the horizon with, as consequences, increased migratory flows and accelerated exportation of violence and drugs throughout the Americas, both north and south.

 

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¹ Editor's note: The Andean countries are Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.
² Editor's note: Colonel Banzer's putsch in Bolivia (1971), military coups in Chile and Uruguay (1973), and a military dictatorship in Argentina (1976).
³ Professor of political science at the European University Institute of Florence.
⁴ The US Army's Southern Command, located in Miami.
⁵ One of many examples: Chile, where Salvador Allende's Popular Unity government was overthrown by the 11 September 1973 coup.